In the world of trade in financial instruments, at any given time, there are buyers and sellers of a given type of financial instrument. Changes in the supply and demand of a particular financial instrument (e.g., the number of buy orders as compared to sell orders for the financial instrument) will generally drive the market price of the financial instrument to rise and fall. Thus, knowledge of the trading posture (e.g., whether a particular entity is a buyer or a seller) can be very valuable information as the entity receiving such information tries to predict which way the market may move.
As is known in the art, an entity interested in purchasing (or selling) financial instruments can communicate its interest to other subscribing financial entities using an Indication of Interest (“IOI”) message transmitted over a messaging system such as, for example, the Tradeweb Routing Network (“TRN”) or Tradeweb's AutEx Network (“AutEx”). The IOI sending entity interested in purchasing or selling financial instruments may be addressing the IOI with incomplete information or no information as to the trading posture of the various IOI targets to which the IOI may be directed. Therefore, if the IOI sender is going to transmit the IOI to a broad range of targets, such targets may include entities that have had no relevant activity with respect to the financial instrument that is the subject of the IOI, same-side activity (i.e., where the IOI is an indication of purchase interest, the target has previously been a buyer), contra-side activity (i.e., where the IOI is an indication of purchase interest, the target has previously been a seller), or has had significant activity in the subject financial instrument as both a seller and buyer. As further described below, a sending entity may direct the IOI to entities that may be willing to provide the contra-side (or part) of the IOI sender's associated transaction. In such a case, the IOI targeting schema has yielded beneficial results for both parties. If, however, the target has had same-side activity, then the IOI sender has revealed potentially valuable information to an entity that is not likely to trade with the IOI sender.
If the IOI reaches a contra-side target, the contra-side target receiving the IOI may then elect to contact and/or transmit a trade order in the financial instrument to the IOI sending entity in hopes of consummating a mutually beneficial transaction. In this case, the IOI target or receiving entity becomes an order sending entity The IOI sending entity then becomes the order target entity and, upon receipt of above referenced trade order in the financial instrument, may then accept and execute the order resulting in the issuance of an execution report to the order sending entity.
A frequent problem occurs when an IOI sender directs an IOI to a second entity that is a same-side target. Such misdirection of an IOI can cause “information leakage,” as it indicates the first entity's trading stance to a second entity in the same position as the first entity. Such IOI misdirection may result in the second entity altering its trading behavior, upon receipt of the misdirected IOI, in such a way that the sender of the IOI may be disadvantaged due to a possible adverse movement of the financial instrument's price.
Faced with this problem, users of messaging systems to trade financial instruments classically have had one of two choices to make: (1) direct their IOI messages to a narrow set of entities that are most likely to be on the opposite side of the transaction (e.g., buyers directing IOI messages to possible sellers), to decreasing the risk of “information leakage,” but increasing the risk that the IOI-sending user will miss valuable trading opportunities (possible contra-side entities), or, alternatively, (2) direct their IOI messages to a broader set of entities, thereby potentially reducing the number of opportunities are missed, but also increasing the risk of “information leakage.”
With reference now to FIG. 3 (prior art) and FIG. 4 (prior art), there is shown an illustration of the technical problem with existing messaging systems for transmitting IOI messages. In FIG. 3 (prior art), there is shown an example of a purchasing user 110 broadly casting an IOI message 210 via messaging system 120. As shown, the purchasing user 110 specifically directs its IOI message 210, via messaging system 120, to broad spectrum of possible selling users 160. As a result, the specifically directed IOI message 212 is received by users 160 that are selling the financial instrument 164, purchasing the financial instrument 168, or disinterested in the financial instrument 166. As described above, whenever IOI message 212 is received by seller user 164, a transaction may be consummated 170. In contrast, when the IOI message 212 is received by a fellow buying user 168, information leakage 174 is likely to occur, and the buying user 168 could take steps that will disadvantage purchasing user 110, which issued the IOI message 210. Finally, if the IOI message 212 is received by a user 166 that is uninterested in entering in any transactions regarding the financial instrument, typically no implications result 172. Thus, in the prior art example of FIG. 3, purchasing user's 110 attempt to reach all potential selling users 160, disadvantageously reached a number purchasing users 160. This is because the user broadly transmitting the IOI will reach all users 160 without regard to the receiving user's trading stance. While this method captures all opportunities, it comes with a high risk of losses due to information leakage.
In the example of FIG. 4 (prior art), there is shown the problems inherent with a purchasing user 110 narrowly casting an IOI message 210 via messaging system 120. As shown, the purchasing user 110 specifically directs its IOI message 210, via messaging system 120, to narrow spectrum of possible selling users 160. As a result, the specifically directed IOI message 212 may be received by users 160 that are selling the financial instrument 164, purchasing the financial instrument 168, or disinterested in the financial instrument 166. Thus, even though the purchasing user 110 attempted to limit information leakage through exposure of the IOI only to a subset of all subscribing users 160, the narrowly cast IOI may still disadvantageously reach some purchasing users. This is because the user transmitting the IOI has very limited information about the actual trading stance of the selected users that will receive its IOI (the information is generally based only on a given IOI target's discourse, i.e. trading or dialogue, with the IOI sending entity). Moreover, in this scenario, while there is a hope of fewer incidents of information leakage, which may or may not be realistic given the lack of usable information, there are also likely to be a number of missed opportunities 176.
As referenced, one technical problem with the prior art systems of FIGS. 3 and 4 is the IOI sending user's lack of relevant information as to the trading posture of potential counterparties. Another technical problem is that users are forced to choose between (i) broadly casting indications of interest to potential counterparties, which may result in information leakage and thereby further result in adverse changes in the market prices of the subject financial instruments, or (ii) narrowly casting indications of interest, which may result is a number of missed opportunities to trade the financial instrument on favorable terms. In light of the foregoing, the present invention seeks to address these and other problems.